While there certainly has been no dearth of research on the Muslim Brotherhood, or Ikhwan, the spectacular rise and fall of the Brotherhood in Egypt between 2011-2013 has raised many puzzling questions. Why did the Brotherhood shift its political strategy from careful coalition-building to unilateralism in the course of 2011 and 2012? Once in power, why was it out of touch with popular mood and did not realise the full extent of opposition against its rule until it was too late? After the mass demonstrations of 30 June 2013 and the military coup of 3 July, why did the Brotherhood opt for a full-out confrontation with the Egyptian army, knowing that this would likely lead to its destruction? Why did it not move to protect the life of its followers by ordering them to disperse the protest camps?
I think we have problems explaining these developments because we do not know enough about the inner life of the Brotherhood and about the attitudes and habits of thinking that move its leaders. It is within this context that I would like to present some preliminary findings of my research about the history of educational thought and practice within the Muslim Brotherhood. I will do this by discussing some aspects of Hasan al-Banna’s Letter of Instructions, which is the foundational text of Muslim Brotherhood pedagogical thought, and comparing their interpretation in later Ikhwani commentaries.
First, let me explain my approach to the subject of Ikhwani education: I think that the prevalent research tendency concerning the Ikhwan is in a way too narrow, because it focuses too much on their political aims, discourses and actions, and not enough on their equally important ambition to shape and re-shape individuals and society. My intent is to give serious consideration to the educational programmes the Muslim Brotherhood has invented to form and indoctrinate their common followers and cadres and to the behavioural patterns and models of selfhood and of everyday life they promote. These aspects, in turn, shape the goals and methods of Islamic activism, and they are fundamental to the importance the Ikhwan give to organization, discipline, and authority. It cannot be stressed enough that every political leader of the Muslim Brotherhood has gone through a long process of education, indoctination and socialisation within the movement that goes far beyond the simple inculcation of a political programme or ideology.
In the language of the Ikhwan, the discourses and practices concerning the mentioned aspects mostly fall under the terms of daʿwa (preaching) and tarbiya (education). Another term frequently mentioned in this context is al-manhaj, the “method, way” of Hasan al-Banna. There is a consensus among the Ikhwan that al-Banna laid down this manhaj in a few topically related letters or treatises (rasa’il), the most important of which being the Letter of Instructions (risalat at-ta’alim).
To understand how the Ikhwan of later generations have interpreted and implemented these Instructions, I looked into a number of commentaries written on this letter by leading Ikhwani intellectuals and functionaries. I also used the testimonies of former and ongoing members of the Ikhwan – in the form of television interviews, books and newspaper articles – to get an impression of how the pedagogical ideas of the Ihkwan were implemented in practice at a certain place and time. Ouf of the rich secondary literature about the Ikhwan, I am mostly indebted to the contibutions by Husam Tammam, Khalil al-Inani, Alison Pargeter, and Mariz Tadros, as well as Gudrun Krämer’s essential biography of Hasan al-Banna.
The Letter of Instructions
The most comprehensive and programmatic formulation of the activism of the Muslim Brotherhood is found in the “Letter of Instructions” (risalat al-ta’alim), which was written and published by Hasan al-Banna in 1938. Its status as a foundational text of Muslim Brotherhood Islam is confirmed by the fact that there exist to this date more than a dozen commentaries on this treatise. While the “Letter of Instructions” is only 16 pages long, some of these treatises fill volumes.
Important commentaries:
- Said Hawwa (1935-1989): Fi Afaq al-Ta’alim, Cairo 1980.
- Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917-1996): Dustur al-wahda al-thaqafiyya bayn al-muslimin, Cairo 1983. Al-Ghazali is one of the most well-known intellectuals of the „Islamic revival“. He left the Ikhwani organization in the 1950s, but remained committed to the legacy of Hasan al-Banna, whom he had known in person.
- Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Nahwa wahda fikriyya li-l-‘amilin fi l-islam, Cairo 1991-2013.
Commentaries by less prominent people, who are highly influential within the Egyptian MB:
- M. ‘Abdallah al-Khatib (with M. Abd al-Halim Hamid): Nazharat fi risalat al-ta’alim, Cairo 1990. Al-Khatib was considered the unofficial mufti of the Ikhwan from the 1980s until the mid-2000s. He was a members of the guidance council and an important functionary in the tarbiya and da’wa departments.
- ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud, Commentary on the 10 Pillars, Cairo 1994-1998.
- Majdi al-Hilali, Raka’iz al-Da’wa, Cairo 1995. A represenative of the younger generation, he is an important figure in the tarbiya department since the 1990s.
Structure and content
The Letter of Instructions consists of three parts: Firstly, the Twenty Fundaments (al-usul al-‘ashrin) of the right understanding (al-fahm) of Islam; secondly, the Ten Pillars (al-arkan al-‘ashara) of the oath of allegiance (al-bay’a). The third, and least important, part is a list of 38 duties.
| الأصول العشرون | Twenty Fundaments |
| الأركان العشرة | Ten Pillars |
| واجبات الأخ العامل | Duties of the Active Brother |
The Twenty Fundaments define how the Muslim Brotherhood understand and practice Islam. The first two fundaments formulate the main ideological tenet of the Ikhwan: that Islam, derived from the Quran and the Sunna, is a comprehensive system that encompasses all areas of modern society.
- all-encompassing character of Islam (1)
- the traditional Islamic sciences, such as Quranic exegesis and rational theology, Hadith and fiqh (2, 5-10)
- correct devotional practice (11-12)
- Sufism and folk religion (3, 4, 13-16)
- ethics (17)
- reason and science (18-19)
- takfir (20)
The general thrust of the 20 Fundaments is threefold: firstly, to reduce Sunni Islam to a set of basic essentials that most pious believers should be able to agree upon; secondly, to clean it from past aberrations, superstitions, and intellectual and mystical speculations; and thirdly to adapt it to the requirements of the modern world while rejecting any compromise with modern ideologies such as secularism, scientism, materialism, liberalism, etc.
The following except, fundaments 18 and 19, serves to illustrate this third tendency, making Islam fit for modernity while rejecting any claim that its dogmatic truths needed to be re-considered or re-interpreted.
| 18- الاسلام يحرر العقل ويحث على النظر في الكون ويرفع قدر العلم والعلماء ويرحب بالصالح النافع من كل شيء […] | 18 – Islam frees the intellect and encourages man to look into the physical world. It raises the value of science and the scientists (ulama) and embraces everything that is good and useful […]. |
| 19- وقد يتناول كل من النظر الشرعي والنظر العقلي ما لا يدخل في دائرة الآخر ولكنهما لن يختلفا في القطعي فلن تصطدم حقيقة علمية صحيحة بقاعدة شرعية ثانتة […] حسن البنا, رسالة التعاليم, ركن الفهم | 19 – While inquiry based on God’s law and inquiry based on reason may treat things that do not interfere or overlap with each other, they will never disagree when it comes to an apodictic ruling. A correct scientific truth will never contradict a fixed fundament of God’s law. […] Hasan al-Banna, Letter of Instructions, Pillar: Understanding |
It is important to note that this principle seems to recognize that science and, by extension, human progress, is concerned with a different field of knowledge than religion and cannot be reduced to religion. It is universal. Muslim can deal with this without letting it shake their faith.
The Ten Pillars are very different in function and content than the Twenty Fundaments. They explain what is expected from people who become fully commited to Islam by becoming active members of the Muslim Brotherhood through a solemn oath of allegiance to the murshid, the bay’a.
The Ten Pillars give a vivid impression of how serious al-Banna was about his idea that Islam can only be successful as an organized, highly disciplined, and strictly hierarchical social movement.
| أركلن البيعة العشرة | The Ten Pillars of the Oath of Allegiance |
| الفهم | understanding |
| الاخلاص | dedication, loyalty (to God) |
| العمل | action |
| الجهاد | jihad |
| التضحية | sacrifice |
| الطاعة | obedience (to the leadership) |
| الثبات | firmness, perseverance |
| التجرد | detachedness (from society, the world) |
| الأخوة | brotherhood, brotherliness |
| الثقة | trust (in the leadership) |
The right understanding of Islam according to the Twenty Fundaments is counted as one of the Ten Pillars. The Pillar “Action” defines the comprehensive character of Muslim Brotherhood activism, ranging from the individual to the family, to society and state, to the world at large. Three Pillars (“Jihad”, “Sacrifice”, “Firmness/Perseverance”) stress that nothing but total and unwavering commitment to the cause is required. As to the relationship of the Brothers among themselves, the Pillars enjoin “Obedience” and “Trust” in the leadership, and universal “Brotherliness” and love. Two Pillars (“Dedication/Loyalty”, “Detachedness”) stress that a Brother cannot be in a relationship of loyalty or friendship with anyone outside the Islamic movement, nor be influenced by their ideas.
| وأريد بالتجرد أن تتخلص لفكرتك مما سواها من المبادئ والأشخاص لأنها أسمى الفكر وأجمعها وأعلاها. […] | By detachedness, I mean that you free your thinking from all other principles or persons, because [Islam] is the most exalted and most complete idea: […] |
| {قَدْ كَانَتْ لَكُمْ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ فِي إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَالَّذِينَ مَعَهُ إِذْ قَالُوا لِقَوْمِهِمْ إِنَّا بُرَآءُ مِنْكُمْ وَمِمَّا تَعْبُدُونَ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ كَفَرْنَا بِكُمْ وَبَدَا بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَكُمُ الْعَدَاوَةُ وَالْبَغْضَاءُ أَبَدًا حَتَّىٰ تُؤْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَحْدَهُ} (الممتحنة 4) | “You have a good example in Abraham and his companions: they said to their people: ‘We totally dissociate ourselves from you, and from the deities that you worship instead of Allah. We renounce you and there has come to be enmity and hatred between us and you until you believe in Allah, the One True God.’” (Qur’an, al-Mumtahana 4) |
| والناس عند الأخ الصادق واحد من ستة أصناف: مسلم مجاهد, أو مسلم قاعد, أو مسلم آثم, أو ذمي معاهد, أو محايد, أو محارب, وللكل حكمه في ميزان الإسلام […] حسن البنا, رسالة التعاليم, ركن التجرد | For the upright Brother, people are from one of six categories: a struggling (mujahid) Muslim, a passive Muslim, a sinful Muslim, a treaty-holding Dhimmi, a neutral, or an enemy of war; for each [of these categories] there exists a ruling on the scales of Islam. Hasan al-Banna, Letter of Instructions |
This principles illustrated the main thrust of the Ten Pillars, namely to create a sworn in-group of committed Muslims who must detach themselves from less committed Muslims and unbelievers to raise the banner of Islam. The contrast, if not contradiction with the call to engage with the scientific achievements of other human beings is obvious. I will return to this tension between outward-looking „intellectual Ikhwanism“ and inward-looking „organizational Ikhwanism“ shortly.
Function and practical implementation
What is the significance of these instructions for the Muslim Brotherhood movement today? How are they implemented in practice? It needs to be mentioned that Hasan al-Banna himself did not expect all of his followers to read and understand the “Letter of Instructions”; in the introduction to the letter, he states that it is only addressed at the most advanced members, so to speak the higher cadres of the movement. So how did the Ikhwani leadership go about putting these ideas into practice?
Observations on the 10 Pillars
As both moral and practical guidelines, the Ten Pillars are of direct relevance to the organizational structure and educational practice of the Ikhwan. The most important component of this is the usar system, the system of cells or families. The system was introduced in 1943 and represents the basic unit in the hierarchic organization makeup of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The families have 5-10 members and are headed by a senior “teacher”. In the ten pillars, Al-Banna describes the role of this person in the following way: A father, who enjoys a bond of heart with his children, a teacher, who inculcates knowledge, a Sheikh who provides spiritual guidance, and a political and military leader (Pillar #10 “Trust”). On the horizontal dimension, utmost attention is given to the fostering of bonds of brotherliness and solidarity between the members of the family
Information about the inner life of the usar confirms that the guidelines laid down by al-Banna shape the inner life of the Ikhwani families today as in the 1940s. Many observers stress that, considering the repression it suffered during long periods in its history, the Muslim Brotherhood would not have survived as an organization if not for the resilience and coherence created by the family system.
One of the problematic corrollaries of this system is the tendency of the Muslim Brotherhood to constitute a closed community, a segregated counter-society that sets itself apart from the rest of human society, including Muslims who are not part of the brotherhood.
Recent research portrays the issue of separation vs. engagement with society or closedness vs. openness as the object of a struggle between different camps within the Brotherhood. One current within the Ikhwan, inspired by the thought of Sayyid Qutb, holds that separation and isolation from society is a necessary step towards creating a totally new Quranic generation. Another tendency, often termed the “reformers” or “moderates”, decry the negative consequences of excessive isolation and calls for more engagement, dialogue, and integration. While the latter tendency, so the observers say, has shaped the political bureau of the Egyptian Ikhwan for much of the last two decades, the former tendency has dominated the less publically visible institutions of the Brotherhood, such as the powerful guidance council.
While I believe that this view is probably too simplistic, a close look commentaries on al-Banna’s pillars confirms that the tensions, or the different directions, it speaks of exist. They are rooted in the foundational texts of al-Banna and can be traced in different commentaries and in the way they deal with the foundations. I am now going to give a few examples of this.
Observations on the 20 Fundaments
A good example of how a “reformer” within today’s Brotherhood would probably deal with the Letter of Instructions is the commentary by Muhammad al-Ghazali, which was first published in 1983. The first notable aspect is that it does not discuss the 10 pillars at all, surmising that the 20 fundaments are the gist of al-Banna’s teaching. The commentary on fundaments 18 and 19, which I have cited above, is interesting: Going far beyond merely explaining the meaning of al-Bannas statement, al-Ghazali argues that, after a period of decline, Muslims must observe other people and civilisations and learn from them. Muslims need to embrace the whole array of modern sciences, from the natural sciences and mathematics to what al-Ghazali calls the “human sciences” in order to raise the cultural level of the umma. Based on these considerations, al-Ghazali citicises the tendency of other Islamists to regard democracy as an ideology that is opposed to Islam, while it is in fact only a set of political arrangements invented by Western societies to prevent despotism.
By comparing al-Ghazali’s work with other commentaries, we can clearly discern a bifurcation in the approach to al-Banna’s legacy. On the one hand, there are authors like al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi who consider themselves followers of al-Banna, but are no longer part of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, there are those who work within the organization of the Ikhwan, notably in its education and propagation departments. While the former, writing in the 1980s and 1990s, stress than al-Banna’s Instructions constitute propositions that may have to be amended or updated, the latter mainly focus on the dogmatic justification of al-Banna’s propositions. Al-Ghazali, for example, proposes to add 10 more points to the 20 fundaments that, among other things, clarify the Islamic position on important contemporary issues like women’s rights and democracy. The organizational cadres, however, show no concern for these issues in their commentaries. Commenting on the fundaments 18 and 19 cited above, they adhere to a more narrow concept of science, which only encompasses the natural sciences and technology. Consequently, their commentaries focus on explaining al-Bannas ideas thoughts about how one can avoid open contradictions between the Quran and scientific discoveries. They stress that Muslims need to acquire scientific knowledge in order to improve the material condition of the umma.
In addition to these differences, there is a clear tendency with independent intellectuals to focus on the 20 fundaments (or more generally, the intellectual aspects of al-Banna’s writings), while the organizational cadres give precedence to the 10 pillars.
The question of intellectual and organizational closure
Their commentaries on the pillar “detachment” are quite revealing. Commenting on the categories of people suggested by al-Banna, al-Khatib/Hamid (1990) add some practical guidelines as to how Muslim Brothers should deal with the people in the different categories:
| المسلمون المجاهدون | Fighting Muslims: love, friendship, solidarity |
| المسلمون القاعدون | Passive Muslims: motivation (tahrik himamihim), councel, excuse (iltimas al-a´dhar) |
| المسلمون الآثمون | Sinful Muslims: admonition, call to repent |
| الذميون | Dhimmis: indulgence, fairness |
| محمد عبدالله الخطيب ومحمد عبد الحليم حامد, نظرات في رسالة التعاليم, ص 290 | M. ‘Abdallah al-Khatib/M. ‘Abd al-Halim Hamid, Considerations on the Letter of Instructions, p. 290 |
Another commentary by Magdi al-Hilali, a leading member of the education department of the Brotherhood in the 1990s and 2000s, further radicalises the propositions of the original text by detailing how “detachment” needs to be applied on all levels of human life.
Under the heading of “al-wala´ wa-l-bara´” (friendship and separation, the term barāʾ refers back to the Quranic verse cited by al-Banna, which includes the phrase „innā bura’ā’u minkum“): “The Muslim frees his bonds of loyality and friendship from everything but God. There is no loyalty to Arab Nationalism, nor to Egyptian patriotism, no loyalty to family or kin, but only to God. The Muslim´s belonging (nasab) is Islam.” (al-Hilali, Raka´iz, p. 126)
Under the heading of “independence of thought/tajrid al-fikr”, Hilali maintains a dichotomy between Islamic thought and anti-Islamic/un-Islamic thought:
| الأخ المسلم جرد فكره من كل فكرة مخالفة للإسلام فالفكرة الإسلامية قد هيمنت عليه ورسخت معانيها في عقله ووجدانه فلا مكان للأفكار المضادة ولا للنظريات المخالفة لمنهج الإسلام كالفكر العلماني والشيوعي الاشتراكي والرأسمالي. مجدي الهلالي, ركائز الدعوة (1995), ص 132 | The Muslim Brother has detached his thought from all ideas that are in disagreement with Islam. The Islamic idea dominates over him and its meanings have become firmly rooted in his mind and feelings. There is no place for ideas that are at variance with the Islamic way or theories that contradict it, like secularist, communist, socialist or capitalist thinking. Magdi al-Hilali, Pillars of the Islamic Call (1995), p. 132. |
In opposition to al-Ghazali, who stresses that there is a broad field of human knowledge and experience that is not religious or ideological, Hilali paints a black-and-white picture in which there is only Islam, and anti-Islam.
He goes on to explain that is especially crucial to keep the simple, untrained Muslim should be completely shielded from un-Islamic thought; advanced people who have acquired a firm “Islamic personality” may study un-Islamic thought for the purpose of knowing its danger and preparing to refute it.
To sum up, the commantaries by the organizational cadres clearly and unequivocally stress the isolationist, exlusivist bend of the original text. Contemporary accounts from inside Ihkwani families (e.g. Samih Fayiz, Jannat al-Ikhwan, Cairo 2013) confirm that this is not just ink on papers, but that Ikhwani educators are very keen on keeping their immature students away from any outside intellectual exposure and strongly discourage them from having any deeper social relations outside their cell and the Brotherhood at large.
Hypotheses
It seems that, historically, the tension between closedness and openness, separation and engagement has remained unresolved within the Ikhwani movement both in practice and in theory. As a preliminary summary, I would dare the hypothesis that, in the late 20th and early 21st century, we can observe a certain pattern of dealing with this tension in practice. From the 1970s until today, i.e. within the context of the Islamic revival and the re-emergence of the Ikhwan as an important player in Egyptian and Arab society, we can observe a four-part segmentation of the movement into independent intellectuals, outward-looking organizational cadres, inward-looking organizational cadres and common members.
All the intellectually more ambitious and independent followers of Hasan al-Banna left the organization of the Ikhwan, all the while remaining ideologically committed to Ikhwanist Islam. It is mainly these people who were responsible for new developments in Islamist thought in the second half of the 20th century, for example the embracing of democracy and human rights.
Some organizational cadres – the more outward-looking among them – were aware of the intellectual production of the independents and made use of it for strategic purposes. The most obvious example for this process are the reformist political programmes of the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1990s until today. However, there was no “trickle-down effect” of these innovations. They seemingly had no impact on the educational thought of the Brotherhood, which remained committed to a much more exclusivist, inward-oriented understanding of Ikhwani Islam derived partly from the Instructions and other writings of Hasan al-Banna in the 1940s and partly from the contributions of Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s and 1960s.
Consequently, the education and word-view of the common members continued to be dominated by this conservative, inward-oriented Ikhwanism of the organizational cadres and completely out of touch with more outward-oriented intellectual Ikhwanism. Some of the literature calls this tendency Qutbism, but I have shown that it is firmly rooted in Hasan al-Banna’s Instructions as well.
Conclusion
What do these observations about Muslim Brotherhood education relate to the post-2011 political performance of the movement? I would like to point out a few interesting points, while stressing that I understand them as preliminary observations that need to be verified and substantiated by further investigations.
1) In the last half-century of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, intellectual Ikhwanism has mostly prospered outside the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Intellectually ambitious and independent individuals tended to leave the organization sooner or later. Might that be a result of the prevalence of strong ties of hierarchy and discipline within the organization that leave little room for independent thinking? And what were the consequences for the organization? As one expert has recently stated: „To strengthen its parallel state, the Brotherhood focused on ideological acculturation and religious education, establishing youth camps, learning centers, and a structured pyramidal organization. The group’s belief system was standardized through ideological education and religious propaganda. Despite shallow attempts to craft the appearance of internal discussion, the movement discouraged independent thinking, intellectual diversity, and critical debates. The aim was to create a strong, unified organization ruled by a politicized elite yet with a mass following based primarily on religious and social values.“ (Ashraf El Sherif, The Muslim Brotherhood’s Failures, Carnegie Endowment, July 2014)
2) It seems that between the 1980s and 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood greatly benefited from the existence of independent Ikhwani intellectuals. It gradually – over the course of several decades – adopted their doctrinal revisions and innovations into its political discourse when it seemed useful and convenient. From an organizational point of view, the functions of „learning“, „intellectualism“ and „adaptation to the changing enviroment“ were out-sourced, while the organization remained completely focused on its own coherence and reproduction. In the post-2011 environment, this division of labour proved deleterious. At a time when fast political learning was required, the MB leadership, suddenly thrown into the limelight, was incapable of dealing with a rapidly changing political and social environment, and it was incapable of communicating its political choices to the broader public. Instead of securing its position in the long run by working to build trust beyond its core constituency, it acted in a way that confirmed the worst suspicions of its critics and contibuted to its downfall. This was because it was dominated by inward-looking cadres and suffered from a lack of outward-looking people in key positions.
3) The segmentation of MB education might also help explain the violence practised by some of its followers in the post-2011 period in several circumstances and incidents. Given the prejudice and narrow-mindedness that can be found in MB educational thought, and the tendency to divorce the educational programmes of the MB from intellectual Ikhwanism, it seems plausible that the common followers are much more intolerant and prone to violence than the MB leadership has been ready to admit.
(Based on a Paper presented at WOCMES 2014, Ankara, 18-22 August 2014)
Sebastian Elsässer 